More specifically, I will consider here particular ideas about vision and seeing, and argue that these are underpinned by particular political positions.
Pitts-Taylor, in her feminist theory-inspired discussion of mirror neurons, also refers to Haraway through Miriam Solomons' advocating of 'situated cognition, defined as the embeddedness of "representations of the world, learning, memory, planning, action and linguistic meaning in the body's environment, conceptual structures, tools and social arrangements" ' (Pitts-Taylor, 2013: 858) . Pitts-Taylor agrees with Solomons in understanding 'situated cognition as strongly resonant with feminist epistemologies, including Donna Haraway's notion of situated knowledges (Haraway 1991) '. However, the one particular aspect that Pitts-Taylor does not engage with in terms of Haraway's situatedness, is vision, because Pitts-Taylor agrees with Solomons in considering 'mirroring as situated, embodied perception'. Thus 'perception' itself remains in place as such and therefore is not examined further in Pitts-Taylor's discussion. Here, ideas will be examined of how scientific perception, in terms of vision and seeing specifically, determines how and why mirror-neuron research -a research both of and about 'seeing' -takes place. Instead, my interest here is why theories such as Hrdy's, which draw on the mirror neuron research and the wider claims mirror neuron research makes about evolutionary psychology, are so popular and widespread in current popular and academic discourses, both in the sciences and humanities, despite the long history of feminist critiques of science such as those of Jordanova and Haraway. I consider here, then, how and why a highly relevant history of feminist critiques of science has not been engaged with, or often even referred to, more widely in mirror neuron and mirror-neuron inspired evolutionary psychology. 5 I therefore also engage to some extent with aspects of the ongoing debates about 'literary Darwinism' and its validity in literary studies which also refer to and rely on claims about mirror neurons. In these terms my discussion here has a two-fold aim: to examine the investments within the kinds of arguments of which Hrdy is but one example but through this to examine further what seems to be at stake more widely in maintaining this discourse.
Literary Darwinism relies on the idea that reading, and specifically the reading of literature, affects readers in particular and predictable ways; ways which have been shaped by evolution. 6 Jonathan Kramnick explains:
Whereas the humanities believe in an infinitely plastic human nature, so the literary Darwinists claim, the biological and social sciences have discovered that the mind evolved many thousands of years ago in response to an environment we no longer live in. Their goal is to show how our evolved cognition can explain particular features of texts or facts about writing and reading (Kramnick, 2011: 316-17) .
Key in Kramnick's account here is the term 'cognition', for both literary Darwinists and evolutionary psychologists more widely rely on cognition as being about feeling, thinking, learning, reading, and writing as transparent, knowable, stable, and universal processes.
Leading literary Darwinist Brian Boyd, for instance, relies on an innate 'theory of mind'
and mirror neurons as products of evolutionary adaptations which make humans 'mind readers': 'mirror neurons […] fire when we see others act or express emotion as if we were making the same action and allow us through a kind of automatic inner imitation to 5 understand their intentions and to attune ourselves to their feelings' (Boyd, 2010: 103-4 (Caselli, 2010: 243-4, italics in original) .
Significantly in relation to Boyd's claims about how mirror neurons allow a finding both of 'others and ourselves', Caselli adds that '[t]he elusive quality of affect […is] essential to its promise of transcending notions of otherness, both within and without the self. Affect promises -creatively -to go beyond what theory -boringly -has been able to examine so far, and brings with this the allure of immediacy' (Caselli, 2010: 244) . Caselli argues, then, that 'affect' is a political concept, which she sees as being deployed 'at a historical point' to 6 assert a trans-historical, natural, spontaneous, and universal emotional dynamic. She places this as being in opposition to the retrospectively defined 'past methodological rigidities' of 'epistemology', 'estrangement', 'and the alleged dogma of constructivism.' Affect, Caselli analyses, invokes the natural, universal, and spontaneous in order to constitute '"the new" in critical theory.' (Caselli, 2010: 241 neurons, regardless of the 'structural' difference between doing and watching. This perspective can see as a difference that which, according to itself, the brain area involved cannot see as a difference, thereby also excluding itself from being the perspective of that brain area, which cannot, after all, know the difference which the perspective claims to know. In these terms the neuroscientists making these observations do not consider how their own observing is itself by definition a product of that brain which they exempt themselves from: as Daston and Galison explain, this is a seeing that claims it can bear 'no trace of the knower' (Daston and Galison, 2007: 16-17 ).
This causes fundamental difficulties around a claimed difference between 'seeing' and 'doing' which is nevertheless itself known through seeing: 'doing' is bounded within individuality and this limit can only be overcome to the extent that the mirror neurons 'allow' is not in fact the 'doing' of another creature, but 'mentally going through the same motions'.
In this sense, 'doing' is not shared between individuals by the mirror neurons, but mirror neurons 'allow' 'doing' as 'mental [...] motion'. Or, to put it otherwise, 'doing' is claimed to be seen as the 'same motions' but one is a non-mental motion which the mirror neurons 'allow' as a mental motion. In assigning to the mirror neurons the 'allowing' as a 'mirror', the non-mental and the mental are, however, therefore defined as separate and unshareable:
the 'mirror' confirms the neurons' 'reflecting' as the production of the same motion yet as a difference through being merely ('just') mental. At the same time, this difference between doing and the mental reflection as motion is not known to the brain area or to its neurons which, we are told, do not distinguish between doing and watching. The difference, in this sense, is not there to be overcome by mirroring, except from and for the seeing which excludes itself from being that of the brain area involved.
To complicate matters even further, however, according to Hrdy's account of the mirror neurons, 'mentally going through the same motions' 'gains' for the 'mimic' (which, again, is not a 'mimic' except in this vision) 'a better understanding of what the actor being copied is intending to do' (Hrdy, 2009: 48) , even though it is not known to be only 'mentally'
for the brain areas or neurons, but only from the non-brain area perspective. The mimic who does not know it is mimicking cannot therefore 'gain' what it does not know it is doing, and indeed, in terms of the brain areas and neurons, is not doing. Nonetheless, this mimicking, under the terms of its unknown difference from itself, previously had an 'understanding' of what an 'actor being copied is intending to do'. There is here also a confusion of time in this account: the mirror neurons are firing regardless of whether there is a doing or a watching, and yet this firing already is known as a copying of something that is yet to take place as an 'intention'. Acting ('actor') therefore must precede a 'doing' (even though it is apparently not a 'doing' either) which is the certain outcome of a future 'intention', where the copying of the acting which is already known to be a copy 'gains' a 'better understanding' not of a 'doing', but only of that intention of a future 'doing'.
In short, neurons which do not know the difference between doing and watching, can through firing without regard for that difference lead to an increased understanding of an intention to do something, even though that something cannot itself be known to be a doing.
In the end, all of this relies on a 'watching' nonetheless: for a doing is being watched as a are. The implications for the perspective are both that it has defined itself as not that brain area itself in terms of its knowledge of the difference between watching and doing, but also that it already always knows in advance that a mimicking (which does not know it is mimicking) is a prediction of a future doing. Moreover, this future doing in turn, inevitably in terms of this logic, is a watched doing, and not an experienced doing, anyway.
It may be important to stress that these problems are not just a result of Hrdy's specific narrative about them but trouble the very grounds of this research in its own right.
For instance in one of the articles referenced by Hrdy (Jackson et al., 2005) , the issue of perspective is also not considered, and this results in a definition of 'empathy' (the core concern of the article, as for Hrdy) which in turn relies on a perspective which has already assumed an ability to have a perfect knowledge of the pain levels and experiences of 'others', in turn relying on already assuming a knowledge of what constitutes the 'self' and what the 'other': 'the activity in the anterior cingulate was strongly correlated with the participant's ratings of the others' pain, suggesting that the activity of this brain region is moderated according to subjects' reactivity to the pain of others' (Jackson et al., 2005: 771) . In other words, a tautology is produced, as the participants' self-assessment is judged to agree with their own self assessment. This research, then, is a perfect example of pre-determining output by following pre-set assumptions; thus the researchers conclude, 'These findings offer one plausible explanation of how one is affected by another person's state and feelings' (Jackson et al., 2005: 777) . The research relies on a perspective which can see both the 'one' and 'another person's' 'state and feelings' and can compare the two as such whilst apparently being itself implicated in neither.
Several scientific critiques of the mirror neuron and empathy research agree with my analysis here: Pierre Jacob and Marc Jeannerod, for instance, argue that '[t]he motor properties of the mirror system are well designed for representing an agent's motor intention involved in an object-oriented action, not for representing an agent's social intention, let alone his communicative intention' (Jacob and Jeannerod, 2005: 24) . John Cartwright, similarly, in considering mirror neurons and the origins of languages warns that the strong interpretation of mirror neurons supplying instant meaning to the observer faces one enormous problem. If it is suggested that mirror neurons only fire when the movement of an arm is directed towards some meaningful action (the grasping of an object) and replicate this meaning instantly inside the head of an observer, and not when confronted by movement alone, such as a hand moving towards a non-existent object, how does the mirror system 'know' that the former is meaningful? In essence, if meaning is supposedly presented instantly in the brain, how can the system decide to be selective before the action is complete? (Cartwright, 2008: 142) In other words, for Cartwright too, as in my analysis, the research methodology is flawed by the scientists assuming simply to be able to see in neuroimages what 'actions' and 'seeing' and the differences between them are. Moreover, both my analysis here and Cartwright's consider the issue of the time of seeing as a fundamental question for the research methodology, for when during the seeing can an action be seen as completed and when and how can it be seen as meaningful or intentional?
Another expert whose research in this area Hrdy refers to relies on the same problematic assumptions around mind-reading, seeing and doing, and intentionality. Hrdy heads her second chapter with a quote from Peter Hobson:
I sat gazing at a chimpanzee who sat on the other side of a fence, gazing at me. (Hrdy, 2009 : 33, citing Hobson, 2004 .
In terms of Hobson's own claims, the 'self' and 'other' and the interaction (or lack of it) between them are already assumed and determinative of Hobson's understanding of what this 'gazing' means: it is the chimp who Hobson already knows is 'gazing at me' but is nevertheless 'not at home, mentally speaking', and therefore is inducing Hobson himself to feel that there is 'something missing, I could not connect'. 8 This 'something missing' is then linked to some cases of a remembered experience 'when relating to a child with autism', so that both 'autism' and being a chimp are about a lack of possibility of connection with an other due to a lack in themselves as chimp and autist. 
Sharing and Giving Gifts; Socialization or Hardwiring?
These difficulties, which result from overlooking (or not seeing as relevant) shifts in claims about the brain, mind, consciousness, seeing (perception) and vision (perspective), undermine the empathy and mindreading which rely on those claims, and therefore also the arguments about (allo)-mothers and infants which in turn rely fundamentally on empathy and mindreading. For Hrdy, the 'urge to share is hardwired', even if 'custom, language and personal experiences shape the specifics' (Hrdy, 2009: 25) , where the 'specifics' of 'custom, language and personal experience' do not obscure for Hrdy the fact that this is all the same 'sharing'. This confidence of Hrdy's in the recognition of sharing extends to a confidence in the recognition of a 'gift' and 'giving', which is in turn as fundamental to the 'empathy and 'mindreading' which underpin her definition of the high degree of interactive engagement of (allo-)mothers and infants. The gift and giving work to demonstrate in Hrdy's argument how much more humans are 'eager to connect with others' (Hrdy, 2009: 23) than even the great apes. Although the claim to 'hardwiring' is essential to Hrdy's evolutionary argument, she is surprisingly equivocal in both her ongoing claims in the text about how 'hardwired' they are, as well as, again, surprisingly equivocal about how sharing and gift-giving are to be defined and recognised.
For instance, directly after the claim that 'a human child is born eager to connect with others' the following claim occurs that 'before Ju/'hoansi children are a year old and able to talk, they are already socialized to share with their mother and other people as well' and that 'the first words a child learns are na ("Give it to me") and i ("Here, take this")' (Hrdy, 2009: 23) . The human child here is born knowing that it is not connected to 'others' and 'eager' to address this deficit, therefore by implication already knowing about connection itself. Yet in the subsequent comments sharing is something the child needs to be 'socialized' to do, which would imply that this is not an originary feature, but a trait which is produced by the interactions with others. In this sense, 'connection' here is different from 'sharing', but perhaps can be taken as a prerequisite willingness to undergo 'socialization' resulting from the innate wish to connect. In any case, the socialization to sharing here stands in direct contradiction to the prior claim that 'the urge to share' itself is 'hardwired'. Similarly, 'among the first words' are 'learn[ed]', and the first words enlisted as examples of this socialization are instructions to 'Give it to me' and 'Here, take this', where the question is how these are to be understood as spontaneous acts of sharing and giving on the part of the child, underscoring the contradiction between the claims to 'hardwiring' and 'socialization'.
These equivocations (advertent or inadvertent) continue throughout: in a subsequent anecdote relayed from anthropologist Polly Wiessner, 'an old woman' places her grandchild's ostrich shell beads 'in the child's hand to present (however grudgingly) to a relative. After the lesson of giving was accomplished [...] This routine was repeated until, by about age nine, children themselves initiated giving' (Hrdy, 2009: 23) . The child has to be instructed to give the beads and how to give the beads to another, doing so 'grudgingly', and the giving again has to be taught as a 'lesson' and through a 'routine'. It is hard to see how this can be taken, even in its own terms, as a description of a 'spontaneous' and 'reciprocal' sharing which Hrdy claims is in contrast to the 'nonhuman apes'' lack of such activity. At the very least it raises for me the question how and why Hrdy is so sure these kinds of anecdotes necessarily support the assertion that sharing and giving are hardwired in humans to a degree they are not in nonhuman apes.
Further on Sharing and Giving Gifts: Altruism or Investment?
Hrdy's further examples, invoked to continue to support these differences between apes and humans, continue throughout to equivocate not only about what demonstrates 'hardwiring',
but also over what constitutes sharing and giving: an 'alpha male chimpanzee grasping the carcass of a monkey he just killed may allow a sexually receptive female or close male associate to rip off a piece, but this is more like "tolerated theft" than a real gift' (Hrdy, 2009: 23) . The notion of a 'real gift' is at stake here, where 'tolerated theft' relies on the ideas that this is an 'alpha male' who can 'allow' only specifically privileged individuals from whom he may expect future reciprocal favours (sexual favours from the female and support from the male), to take by force ('rip') for themselves a small part of the meat. This is contrasted with 'real gifts' in terms of 'humans' who 'routinely offer preferred foods to others -the best hospitality we can possibly provide' (Hrdy, 2009: 23) . This version of the 'real gift' neither coincides with Hrdy's anecdotes of the 'socialization' in to giving, nor is it consistent with her further accounts of the anthropology of gift-giving where she states, for instance, that the 'point is not merely to share but to establish and maintain social networks' (Hrdy, 2009: 12) .
This equivocation between sharing, and gift-giving as spontaneous, voluntary and altruistic, and sharing and gift-giving as canny investments in social networks can be tracked (Haraway, 1991: 350) , and in line with this I read an inevitable regression in Hrdy's definitions back to that very competitiveness which she hoped to overturn in Mothers and Others in favour of an evolutionary account of cooperation. In that classic twist of capitalist logic, as Haraway puts it, even Hrdy's gift-giving turns out after all to be a self-interested investment, albeit with a possibly longer-term, deferred return; as Hrdy writes, 'The people you treat generously this year, with the loan of a tool or gift of food, are the same people you depend on next year when your waterholes dry up or game in your home range disappears' (Hrdy, 2009:6) .
Hrdy, characteristically, also takes Marcel Mauss's classic Essai sur le Don (The Gift)
to be arguing that the 'point is not merely to share but to establish and maintain social networks' (Hrdy, 2009 : 12, referring to Mauss, 1990 ), while Mary Douglas, in her 'Foreword. No free gifts' to the English translation of The Gift argues that 'The Essay on the Gift was a part of an organized onslaught on contemporary political theory, a plank in the platform against utilitarianism', highlighting how she reads Mauss's text 'in a tradition strongly opposed to English liberal thought' (Douglas, 1990: viii) . For Douglas, then, unlike for Hrdy's illustrative anecdotes, Mauss's text is not about liberal, self-interested, investment agents, acting as individual units (even in terms of cooperation), but instead 'rightly remarks that the concept of interest is itself modern' (Douglas, 1990: xiv) and establishes as axiomatic that a field report would be below standard unless a complete account could be given of all transfers, that is, of all dues, gifts, fines, inheritances and successions, tributes, fees and payments; when this information is in place one also knows who gets left at the end of the day without honour or citizenship and who benefits from the cumulative transfers. With such a chart in hand the interpreter might be capable of sensing the meanings of ballads, calypsos, dirges, and litanies; without it one guess will do as well as any other (Douglas, 1990 : xiixiii).
The equivocation in Hrdy's arguments can then be taken in this sense as not an arbitrary equivocation but as born out of her specifically liberal, capitalist conceptions of the liberal individual and its 'gifts', 'giving' and 'sharing'. In other words, what has taken place is a shift from Douglas' reading of Mauss's argument as about systems of meaning to Hrdy's reading of it as the registration of individuals' expressions of innate features.
Mothers and Mothering
The difficulties traced above reverberate continuously throughout the ideas of mothers and mothering in the text. The paradox is that what is good and bad in the infant's environment is not in fact a projection, but in spite of this it is necessary, if the individual infant is to develop healthily, that everything shall seem to him to be a projection. [...] and to this observation we can add that the recognition of a true 'not-me' is a matter of the intellect; it belongs to extreme sophistication and to the maturity of the individual (Winnicott, 1976: 38) .
As with Hobson's chimp and autistic child who were invoked by Hrdy as making
Hobson feel that they were 'mentally not at home' but assumed thereby as separate, autonomous entities responsible for communicating to him their 'not at home'-ness, question the motor theory of social cognition would be to challenge it to account for the human capacity to read one's own mind or to ascribe false beliefs to others -something that healthy human adults do all the time without effort' (Jacob and Jeannerod, 2005: 21) . As with Jacob and Jeannerod, for Hrdy these things are indeed something that 'healthy adults do all the time without effort' and this forms the grounding assumption for her readings and arguments in every case.
As Hrdy writes:
At some point in the emergence of the genus Homo, however, mothers became more trusting, handing even quite young infants over to others to temporarily to interpreting the intentions of others, an activity which in turn would affect the organization of their neural systems (Hrdy, 2009: 114-15) .
A primary 'separation' is here therefore already in place from the start and is extended through further physical separation. Both the primary and enhanced separation must, however, be overcome, and it is this that 'empathy', 'mindreading', 'connection' and 'intention' are invoked to negotiate. Finally, it is the responsibility of this baby ready from birth to undertake these tasks to ensure its own survival in these terms that is the evolutionary driver in Hrdy's theory of mothers, others and babies: 'I [Hrdy] am arguing that the most plausible way to explain this difference between humans and other apes is to take into account the vast stretch of time [...] during which babies who were better at gauging the intentions of others and engaging them were also better at eliciting care, and hence more likely to survive into adulthood and reproduce' (Hrdy, 2009: 117) .
Conclusion: What Counts as a Legitimate Scientific Narrative?
There are many ways in which, as Peter Ellison put it in his review of Mothers and Others, 'it is useful, when presented with any T(A)E [a theory of (almost) everything], to imagine the logical alternatives and to think them through' (Ellison, 2009: 447) , and he proposes some of his own. However, this article has not sought to pursue such an imagining. Instead, it has sought to produce readings of Hrdy's text, and several of the texts she invokes in turn, which do not rely on certain given assumptions about science and scientific narrative and how they must be written and read. Instead, taking prior arguments from the history of feminist critiques of science as a starting point, it has re-traced, through close readings of Hrdy,
Haraway's critique in Primate Visions (1989) of a vision of 'science' which sets it in opposition to 'fiction', and a 'nature' in opposition to 'culture' (amongst other oppositions).
These oppositions rest on the same ideas of self-constituted, natural entities which can always already be seen to be as separate as Hrdy's adult and baby mindreaders and empathizers and as the mirror neuron systems they in turn rely on also rest on such oppositions. (Hrdy, 2009: 4) .
Clearly, it would be churlish to question such a beautiful story; but more than that, were anyone to do so then their questioning of the 'us' itself defines the questioner for those who believe in such theories as not 'us' but, therefore, as a 'stranger' or 'other'. This stranger or other is, however, now one who by implication can neither be identified with nor whose suffering can be vicariously experienced. This returns us to the old conundrum that when and where feminism -or any politics of liberation -comes to demand an unquestioning allegiance to an unquestionable truth, it automatically comes to rest on a political dynamic of exclusion and hierarchy in turn; and never more so than when it insists that it has mastered that conundrum.
Notes
1. See: V. Gallese et al. (1996) and V. Gallese and A. Goldman (1998) . The ongoing persistence of the investment in 'mirror-neurons' and their implications is reflected, for instance, in the 2014 publication of a special issue of the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society on 'Mirror neurons', compiled and edited by P. Ferrari and G. Rizzolatti.
2. See for an excellent, wider critique of the mirror neuron research which is not specifically, however, concerned with gender or vision in the sense I am considering here, R. Leys (2012) , and for a recent, scientific critique of the statistical claims of neuroscientific research: K. Button et al. (2013) . Leys is puzzled at the ongoing popularity of mirror neuron theories and their resistance to both scientific and theoretical critiques, but does not make this question the focus of her article, concluding that 'Simply put, the network of presuppositions and methods associated with the Basic Emotions View is too attractive and the laboratory methods too convenient to be given up' (Leys, 2012: 6) .
3. See for Haraway's original critiques of Hrdy's work both Haraway (1989) and (1991) . 9. For an extensive analysis of how 'autism' is constructed as a lack which nevertheless knows about its own lack, see H. Ainslie (2011) .
